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INTRODUCTION
The First Amendment commands that “Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof.”1 The Framers intended for the Establishment Clause to erect a wall
separating the relations of church and state.2 This metaphor is an accepted
conceptualization of the relationship between church and state that
represents the notion that the state neither inhibit nor advance any religion.3
Thomas Jefferson’s architectural symbolism illustrating the meaning of the
1. See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2. See DANIEL DREISBACH, THOMAS JEFFERSON AND THE WALL OF SEPARATION

BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE 1-2 (2002) (recounting Thomas Jefferson’s celebration of
the division of religion and civil government in a letter to Danbury Baptist Association
of Connecticut on January 1, 1802).
3. See id. at 2 (conveying that religion is a voluntary and intimately personal
endeavor; political intrusions would implicate an individual’s rights of conscience).
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First Amendment sparked debate about its implications for church-state law.4
Despite a declaration forbidding the establishment of religion in the
Constitution, there are many religious references throughout American
government including: “One Nation Under God” in the pledge of allegiance
and “In God We Trust” on U.S. currency.5 Many of these traditions are now
widely accepted as part of American culture; however, some traditions, such
as government sanctioned prayer, face repeated challenges in the Court as
potential violations of the First Amendment.6
This Comment examines the constitutionality of state legislator-led prayer
by focusing on a circuit split between the Fourth and Sixth Circuits regarding
prayers at local government board meetings led directly by elected
commissioners.7 Part I describes the current Supreme Court jurisprudence
surrounding legislative prayer, specifically by exploring Marsh v. Chambers
and Town of Greece v. Galloway.8 Part I also introduces the circuit court
cases that analyze the constitutionality of prayer practices at local Board of
Commissioner meetings.9 Part II compares the cases at issue in the current
circuit split: Fourth Circuit case Lund v. Rowan County and Sixth Circuit
case Bormuth v. County of Jackson.10 Part II argues that both the Fourth
4. See id. at 2-4 (discussing the reliance on Jefferson’s metaphor in Supreme Court
jurisprudence, specifically Justice Black’s reference in the Everson v. Board of
Education opinion).
5. See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 442 (1962) (identifying that as a nation, we
are a religious people and our institutions presuppose a higher being).
6. See generally Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 317 (2000) (ruling
that a school district’s policy permitting students to lead prayers before a football game
was a violation of the Constitution); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 586 (1992) (holding
clerical members presiding over invocation and benediction at a public school graduation
was inconsistent with the Establishment Clause); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 794795 (1983) (upholding the traditional practice of legislative prayer led by a paid clergy
member); Engel, 370 U.S. at 424 (holding the prayer practices of the Board of Education
violate the Establishment Clause despite parents’ ability to opt-out).
7. See Patrick L. Gregory, Circuit Split on Legislator-Led Prayer Could Entice
Supreme Court, BNA (Sept. 17, 2017), https://www.bna.com/circuit-split-legislatorledn57982087849/ (indicating that such a rigid split between circuit courts could prompt the
Supreme Court to take up the issue of legislative prayer for the third time).
8. See infra Part I (demonstrating how the Court handles claims challenging
legislative prayer, and the Court’s clarification in Town of Greece v. Galloway that
legislative prayer was not a mere carved out exception to Establishment Clause
jurisprudence).
9. See infra Part I (summarizing the decisions filed in Lund v. Rowan County and
Bormuth v. County of Jackson).
10. See infra Part II (demonstrating the differences in how each circuit analyzed the
prayer practices performed at local board meetings).
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Circuit and Sixth Circuit correctly applied precedent despite reaching
different verdicts as to the constitutionality of legislator-led prayer.11
Finally, Part II proposes that if the Sixth Circuit considered additional
evidence offered to supplement the record, the court would find the prayer
practices in Jackson County, Michigan, violate the Constitution.12 Part III
recommends that the Supreme Court take up the issue to answer looming
questions regarding the constitutionality of legislator-led prayer and
establish a framework for analysis to be followed by lower courts.13 Part IV
concludes by reiterating the unique significance of legislative prayer in
Establishment Clause jurisprudence and the implications of such precedent
in the current circuit split.14
I.

BACKGROUND

A. The First Amendment
The First Amendment contains two clauses regarding religion: the
Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause.15 These clauses were
made applicable to states through incorporation by the Fourteenth
Amendment.16 The Establishment Clause has been interpreted by the Court
to mean that the government may not hold one religion or the absence of
religion to be greater than any other religion.17 The Court has created various
11. See infra Part II (distinguishing the factual records in each case and noting the
fact-sensitive considerations a court must make in determining the constitutionality of
particular legislative prayer practices).
12. See infra Part II (exploring the outcome of Bormuth if the Sixth Circuit had
considered videos of commissioner’s treatment of the plaintiff and additional facts
provided by the amicus brief filed by Americans United for the Separation of Church
and State).
13. See infra Part III (explain that District Courts around the nation have also issued
conflicting rulings on the topic of legislative prayer due to a lack of guidance from the
Court).
14. See infra Part IV (concluding that courts should examine claims challenging the
constitutionality of legislative led prayer on a case-by-case basis due to the fact-sensitive
nature of the Court’s method of analysis).
15. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (stating Congress shall not make laws regarding the
establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise of religion).
16. See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 13-15 (1947) (noting that prior to the
passage of the Fourteenth Amendment, First Amendment restraints did not apply to states
but many state constitutions still adopted similar provisions protecting religious
liberties).
17. See id. at 15-16 (identifying that neither state nor federal government may set up
a religious worship center, force or influence citizens to practice a religion, or levy taxes
to benefit a religious group).
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tests to evaluate Establishment Clause claims; the most commonly applied
test is the Lemon Test which requires the government’s practice (1) to have
a secular legislative purpose, (2) its principal and primary effect must neither
advance nor inhibit religion, and (3) it must not nurture an unnecessary
entanglement with religion.18 Challenges to legislative prayer practices are
Establishment Clause inquiries; however, the Court has not analyzed these
claims using the tests because the Court rested its holding on historical
analysis.19
B. Supreme Court Jurisprudence of Legislative Prayer
1.

Marsh v. Chambers and the Historic Importance of Legislative Prayer

The Supreme Court first answered challenges brought against the
constitutionality of legislative prayer in the 1983 case, Marsh v. Chambers.20
Ernest Chambers, a member of the Nebraska Legislature from the Eleventh
District, brought suit to enjoin the legislature’s prayer practice led by a
chaplain paid by the state.21 The majority opinion upheld the prayer practices
of the Nebraska legislature based largely on the support of history and
tradition.22 The Court asserted that legislative prayer does not conflict with
the Establishment Clause based on the prayer policies adopted by the First
Congress which allowed for a chaplain to be chosen and paid by the
government, just as the case in the Nebraska Legislature.23 While historical
patterns alone would not permit a modern constitutional violation, the
majority of the Court believed the historical context surrounding legislative
prayer revealed that the Framers did not intend to prohibit legislative

18. See generally Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) (holding statutes
that provide state aid to church-related educational institutions are unconstitutional).
19. See Bormuth v. Cty. of Jackson, 870 F.3d 494, 515 (6th Cir. 2017) (en banc)
(noting that Justice Burger, the author of the opinion in Lemon, also wrote the opinion in
Marsh that neglected to apply the tests to legislative prayer).
20. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 784 (1983) (upholding the
constitutionality of Nebraska’s legislative prayer practices that employed a chaplain, paid
by the state, to open each legislative session).
21. See id. (identifying that Ernest Chambers brought the action under 42 U.S.C. §
1983).
22. See id. at 786 (explaining that the tradition of legislative prayer has existed in the
United States since colonial times, persisted through the nation’s founding, and coexisted
with “principles of disestablishment and religious freedom” ever since).
23. See id. at 787 (noting the lack of legislative prayer during the Constitutional
Convention and emphasizing Congress’s appointment of committees to establish a
statute that would provide compensation to chaplains).
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prayer.24 Legislative prayer has been and, according to Marsh, will remain
a tradition so long as the prayer practice does not proselytize or advance a
particular religion and does not disparage other faiths.25
Taken alone, Marsh v. Chambers, appeared to create an exception to
Establishment Clause doctrine.26 Confusion spawned from the majority
opinion’s failure to apply the dominant Establishment Clause test, the Lemon
Test, in the context of legislative prayer.27 Instead, the Court in Marsh relied
on a historical analysis to uphold the practice’s constitutionality by treating
legislative prayer differently than other Establishment Clause claims such as
school prayer.28 Nevertheless, Justice Brennan’s dissent in Marsh illustrates
that if the Court applied the Lemon Test, legislative prayer would undeniably
fail all three prongs.29 The Court did not address the issue of legislative
prayer again until three decades after the ruling of Marsh.30
2.

Town of Greece v. Galloway: An Expansion of Marsh

Since 1983, lower courts have struggled with the question of whether and
how the ruling in Marsh applied to prayer practices in city councils and

24. See id. at 814-815 (announcing that James Madison, a strong proponent of
religious freedom and the drafter of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment,
voted for the bill authorizing payment of chaplains in 1789).
25. See Kenneth A. Klukowski, In Whose Name We Pray: Fixing the Establishment
Clause Train Wreck Involving Legislative Prayer, 6 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 219, 222
(2008) (adopting dicta from Marsh to create a standard applicable to future cases
questioning legislative prayer practices).
26. See Marsh, 463 U.S. at 796 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (concluding the majority
was simply carving out an exception to the Establishment Clause rather than reshaping
existing doctrine to accommodate legislative prayer because the majority neglected to
analyze the prayer practices through settled doctrine).
27. See generally Scott W. Gaylord, When the Exception Becomes the Rule: Marsh
and Sectarian Legislative Prayer Post-Summum, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 1017, 1019 (2011)
(highlighting that the majority opinion failed to mention Lemon v. Kurtzman, let alone
distinguish the case).
28. See Marsh, 463 U.S. at 795-96 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (explaining that the
Court’s limited rationale shall not threaten the overall fate of the Establishment Clause).
29. See id. at 800-801 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasizing that law students
applying the principles of the Lemon test to legislative prayer nearly unanimously find
the practice to be unconstitutional).
30. See David Masci, 5 Facts About the U.S. Supreme Court’s Public Prayer Case,
PEW RES. CTR. (November 6, 2013), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2013/11/
06/5-facts-about-the-u-s-supreme-courts-public-prayer-case/ (suggesting the Court’s
ruling in a new legislative prayer case would hinge on whether the new panel of judges
interprets Marsh broadly or narrowly).

https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol27/iss1/4

6

Ellis: Legislator-Led Prayer

2018]

LEGISLATOR-LED PRAYER

103

county commissioner offices.31 The Court addressed this inquiry and
elucidated many of the questions surrounding the Marsh opinion in response
to a suit filed in 2013 by citizens of Greece, New York, requesting an
injunction to limit the opening prayer practice at the town’s public board
meetings to inclusive and nonsectarian prayers.32
The town’s monthly board meetings opened with an invocation led by a
local clergy member.33 Even though all of the participating clergy from
1999-2007 were Christian, the town maintained that it would never exclude
or deny an opportunity to any prospective prayer giver.34 Despite the explicit
references to the Christian faith during the town’s opening prayers, the Court
upheld the constitutionality of the prayer practice as permissible under the
Establishment Clause because the board’s informal selection method did not
exclude religions other than Christianity and permitted other religious groups
to give the invocation.35
The opinion in Town of Greece directly rejects the long-standing
assumption that Marsh carved an exception into the Establishment Clause
by explaining that the majority in Marsh did not find applications of formal
tests necessary because the history of legislative prayer provided ample
support for its holding.36 The Court’s analysis in Town of Greece, unlike

31. See Perry Dane, Prayer Is Serious Business: Reflections on Town of Greece, 15
RUTGERS J.L. & RELIGION 611, 614 (2014) (exploring whether, under Marsh, lower
courts may find practices “too sectarian” and therefore a violation of the Establishment
Clause).
32. See Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1817 (2014) (noting the
respondents did not seek to end the town’s prayer practice).
33. See id. at 1816 (indicating the prayer practice initiated in 1999 by a newly elected
town supervisor who adopted the practice from his time serving in the county
legislature).
34. See id. (indicating the town selected prayer givers from a list of local
congregations that are majority Christian); see also Dominic Perella, As Supreme Court
Tackles Legislative Prayer, It’s 1789 All Over Again, MSNBC (Nov. 6, 2013, 4:35 PM)
http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/supreme-court-tackles-legislative
(expressing
petitioners’ anguish that the board only began allowing clergy from other faiths to give
the invocation after petitioner filed formal complaints).
35. See Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1816-18 (noting references to distinct language
that invoked Christian religious holidays, scripture, and occasionally doctrine).
36. See Paul Horwitz, The Religious Geography of the Town of Greece v. Galloway,
2014 SUP. CT. REV. 243, 250 (2014) (explaining that the Court uses the Establishment
Clause doctrine as a supplement to its analysis rather than historical support as an
exception); see also Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1819 (noting that a test that sweeps
away settled practices would create controversy and awaken the very religious divisions
the Establishment Clause seeks to prevent).
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Marsh, does not stop at a historical inquiry.37 While legislative prayer is
constitutional, courts determine whether the particular prayer practice falls
within the traditional scope of the Establishment Clause by evaluating if the
prayer is given to solemnize rather than proselytize.38 Petitioners claimed
that the town’s practices were outside the purview of tradition because the
prayers were sectarian and the setting of the board meetings elicits social
pressures forcing nonadherents to participate for fear of being ostracized.39
The Court rejected the notion that the constitutionality of legislative prayer
hinges on the neutrality of the content because the proposition is inconsistent
with the facts and holding in Marsh; therefore, the Court denied the
petitioners’ request to enjoin the sectarian language of the prayers in
Greece.40 The Court refused to issue a judicial decree that such prayers
remain nonsectarian; however, the Court implied that content is not
necessarily free from all constraints if the remarks disparage nonadherents,
threaten damnation, or preach conversion.41
Furthermore, the Court denied petitioner’s request to distinguish this case
from Marsh because prayers at town board meetings and invocations before
Congress are fundamentally different.42 The Court noted that the intended
audience of the opening prayers were lawmakers rather than the members of
the public in attendance and that the prayers were offered to elevate the mind
of officials before governing.43 Even though the Court found no evidence of
37. See Krista M. Pikus, Hopeful Clarity or Hopeless Disarray?: An Examination of
Town of Greece v. Galloway and the Establishment Clause, 65 CATH. U. L. REV. 387,
388 (2015) (clarifying that the analysis used by the court focused on history and
nondiscriminatory procedure rather than a settled Establishment Clause test).
38. See Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1824 (identifying that a challenge based purely
on the content of the prayer will likely not establish a violation).
39. See id. (emphasizing the coercive nature of the prayer practice which forces
members of minority faiths to partake in behavior against their beliefs for fear of
offending the officials that will vote on matters before the board).
40. See id. at 1821-1822 (explaining the contention that legislative prayer must be
nonsectarian came from dictum in County of Allegheny v. ACLU, and further asserting
that the content of prayer is not the concern of the judges unless the practice attempts to
proselytize, advance, or inhibit any one faith).
41. See id. at 1822 (finding that a holding that invocations must be nonsectarian
would force legislatures to censor religious speech, creating an even greater government
involvement in religious matters).
42. See id. at 1824-25 (suggesting the intimate nature of town board meetings where
citizens come to speak on local issues, petition for action by the board, or seek permits
creates a coercive atmosphere for the nonbeliever that does not wish to offend board
members or fellow citizens).
43. See id. at 1826 (noting that while some members of the public may find meaning
in the prayers and wish to join, the prayers should enlighten the lawmakers).
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coercion in the prayer practices in Town of Greece, the Court noted its
analysis would be different if town board members directed the public to
partake in the prayers, showed bias toward dissidents, or specifed that a
failure to participate affects their governing decisions.44 Today, there is a
circuit split regarding whether prayers led directly by commissioners at local
board meetings go beyond constitutionally permitted legislative prayer.45
C. Circuit Split on Legislator-Led Prayer
1.

Lund v. Rowan County

The Board of Commissioners in Lund held the practice of personally
delivering a deliberate sectarian prayer at the start of each county board
meeting inconsistent with the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment.46 In Lund, board members were permitted to use their
discretion as to the content of the prayer during their rotation, but
undoubtedly all commissioners gave prayers filled with Christian sentiment
by invoking the name of the Lord as the one true way to salvation.47 The
Fourth Circuit distinguished Lund from Town of Greece by stating that the
Supreme Court did not address lawmaker-led prayer, only prayer led by
clergy.48 Ultimately, the Fourth Circuit determined that prayer led by
legislators may fit within the constitutional bounds, but the prayer practices
of the Lund County Board of Commissioners fell outside the scope of
traditionally protected legislative prayer due to the attempts made by
commissioners to promote Christianity as the one true religion.49
2.

Bormuth v. County of Jackson

Just two months after the Fourth Circuit decided Lund, the Sixth Circuit
upheld similar lawmaker-led prayer practices in Bormuth v. County of
44. See id. (indicating that clergy members invited members of the public to stand
and participate, rather than the board members directly instructing them to do so).
45. See Gregory, supra note 7 (summarizing the uncertainty created when the Sixth
Circuit upheld the constitutionality of legislator-led prayer in direct opposition to a
Fourth Circuit holding just months prior).
46. See Lund v. Rowan Cty., 863 F.3d 268, 272 (4th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (indicating
the prayer practice only permitted commissioners to offer the invocation).
47. See id. at 273 (demonstrating that 97 percent of the board’s prayers over the past
five and a half years made purely Christian references such as “Jesus,” “Christ,” or
“Savior” and the commissioners referenced no other religion).
48. See id. at 277-78 (elaborating that the “historical practice of prayer” is not
identical to the challenge before the Fourth Circuit).
49. See id. at 289 (establishing that the court should look at the prayer practice
holistically to determine the constitutionality of the practice).
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Jackson because a historical analysis showed that such prayer had a longstanding tradition with roots in the American Revolutionary period and
reportedly began in Michigan in 1879.50 The Sixth Circuit described the
prayers as largely solemn, reverent, and contemplative.51 The court indicated
that pro se litigant Bormuth failed to meet his burden to prove that the Board
attempted to indoctrinate, coerce participation, or allocate benefits or
burdens with respect to his adherence.52 The Court acknowledged that
commissioners in Bormuth lost their cool and acted negatively toward the
petitioner; however, nothing in the record indicated the behavior resulted
from the petitioner’s discontent with the prayer practice.53
II. ANALYSIS
A. A Fact-Sensitive Analysis Demonstrates that Both the Fourth and Sixth
Circuits Correctly Applied Establishment Clause Jurisprudence to the
Facts Before Each Circuit Notwithstanding the Conflicting Rulings
This year, the Fourth Circuit and Sixth Circuit heard cases challenging the
constitutionality of prayer practices at local community board meetings
where opening prayers were led directly by the commissioners of the board.54
The directly opposing outcomes elicited from the Circuit Courts’ opinions
implied that one circuit court ruled correctly while the other misapplied
precedent; however, the fact-sensitive consideration required in
Establishment Clause inquiries regarding legislative prayer proves that both
circuits ruled correctly with the record of facts presented before them.55 A
50. See Bormuth v. Cty. of Jackson, 870 F.3d 494, 510 (6th Cir. 2017) (en banc)
(explaining that the historical reliance here parallels those relied on in Marsh and Town
of Greece).
51. See id. at 497-98 (suggesting the Board opens its public meetings with prayers
consistent with the historical practices of Congress and state legislatures, which the Court
upheld as consistent with the First Amendment).
52. See id. at 519 (stating that there is nothing in the record that suggests that the
actions against Bormuth were the result of his religious beliefs or evidence to rebut the
presumption that adults understand the purpose of invocations).
53. See id. at 545 (Moore, J., dissenting) (indicating that the commissioners turned
their chairs around while petitioner Bormuth spoke at a meeting and made statements to
the press after litigation commenced).
54. Compare Lund, 863 F.3d at 271 (holding the prayer practices of the Board of
Commissioners in Rowan County unconstitutional), with Bormuth, 870 F.3d at 498
(upholding the prayer practices of the County of Jackson commissioners as consistent
with the First Amendment).
55. See Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1814 (2014) (establishing that
challenges to legislative prayer require a fact-sensitive inquiry into the “setting in which
the prayer arises and the audience to whom it is directed” to show the town leaders are
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difference of ruling among the circuits is not surprising when looking at the
prayer practices illustrated in each record and subsequently reviewed by each
circuit sitting en banc.56 Unlike the commissioners in Bormuth that simply
mentioned the Christian faith during prayers by referencing Jesus or the Holy
Spirit, commissioners in Lund made attempts to proselytize by expressing
that Jesus is the only way to salvation and condemn nonbelievers by holding
out that Christianity is superior to other religions.57 The prayer practice in
Rowan County portrayed the Board’s endorsement of Christianity.58 The
subtle distinctions between the prayer practices illustrate that the practice in
Lund, unlike Bormuth, exceeded the traditional scope of legislative prayer
by holding out Christianity as superior to other religions.59 Through the
application of Marsh and Town of Greece, both courts ruled correctly
regardless of the apparently conflicting rulings on similar issues in the same
year because the factual distinctions warrant the courts’ respective
outcomes.60
1. Legislator-Led Prayer Inquiries Require Courts to Take a Totality of
Circumstances Approach Because a Single Factor Analysis Is Inconsistent
with Supreme Court Precedent.
When weighing the facts of particular prayer practices, a court must first
evaluate the prayer practice against the backdrop of the historical practice of
legislative prayer that has become so significant to the nation’s heritage and

not coercing the members of the public to engage in religious activities that are not of his
or her own conscience).
56. Compare Lund, 863 F.3d at 273 (describing the prayer practices as “invariably
and unmistakably Christian in content”), with Bormuth, 870 F.3d at 509-10 (describing
the prayers as consistent with the traditionally permitted prayers given before Congress
as an act to solemnize the proceeding).
57. Compare Bormuth, 870 F.3d at 498 (informing that the prayers asked for
blessings for community members facing hardships and military members), with Lund,
863 F.3d at 273 (emphasizing that Christianity is the only religion represented in prayers
referring to “King of kings and Lord of lords,” asking for forgiveness of sins, and
proclaiming God as the only way to happiness and an everlasting eternal life).
58. See Lund, 863 F.3d at 283 (stating that the identification of a state with one
religion cannot be ignored and doing so equates to wishing away the Establishment
Clause).
59. Compare Bormuth, 870 F.3d at 498 (noting that the Board adopted the prayer
practice without discriminatory intent to any religion) with Lund, 863 F.3d at 282
(highlighting that the risk of division stemming from the prayer practice causes more
than an abstract concern for constitutional protections).
60. See Gregory, supra note 7 (noting the rigid discrepancies between the Fourth
Circuit and Sixth Circuit rulings regarding legislator-led prayer).
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tradition.61 Historical analysis is important because prayer practices that fall
outside the generally accepted practice of solemnizing governmental
proceedings and either endorse one religion or condemn patrons of other
faiths violate the First Amendment’s disestablishment principles.62 In
addition to considering history, the court must consider the setting of the
prayer, the intended audience of the invocation, and the pattern of prayers
offered when evaluating whether the prayer practice is permissible.63 This
analysis will help to determine whether the prayer practice is permissible if
the practice falls within the traditional scope accepted by the Court or
whether the prayer practice is impermissible because the practice is used to
proselytize and promote one religion over others or condemns and burdens
nonadherents.64 A prayer practice is impermissible if it is overly coercive,
attempts to indoctrinate, or condemns nonbelievers.65
It is crucial to assess the totality of the circumstances rather than dissecting
and evaluating the prayer practice piece by piece because a singular
statement may be permissible when given by a clergy member before
Congress but impermissible when given by a government official, acting in
his official capacity, such as at a town hall meeting.66 Citizens in attendance
at local board meetings experience these prayer practices in their entirety
rather than piece by piece; therefore, courts must consider all of the facts
61. See Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1814 (2014) (assuming that
a “reasonable observer” witnessing opening prayers at government meetings is familiar
with the tradition and understands the purpose of the prayer is to solemnize and
acknowledge the role of religion in the lives of many private citizens); see also Cty. of
Allegheny v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 492 U.S. 573, 603 (1989) (stating that history
affects the permissibility of religious references by the government, but history cannot
legitimate practices that identify the government with any particular religion or sect).
62. See Cty. of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 670 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment in
part and dissenting in part) (asserting that Marsh exemplifies that the Establishment
Clause must be interpreted in reference to historical practices, not that historical
foundations creates an automatic exception).
63. See generally Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 792 (1983) (explaining that the
Establishment Clause does not prohibit the regulation of conduct simply because it is
intertwined with religious cannons).
64. See id. (suggesting that the invocations should be given for the benefit of the
elected officials to elevate spirits before setting one’s mind to the governance of the
people rather than to “benefit” the public in attendance).
65. See Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1824 (noting a single prayer will not
necessarily depredate a prayer practice that reflects the tradition of legislative prayer).
66. See Lund v. Rowan Cty., 863 F.3d 268, 289 (4th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (indicating
that facts relevant to the court’s inquiry are not necessarily outcome determinative, but
the court should not overlook the crucial interaction of elements when evaluating the
constitutionality of the practice).
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surrounding the prayer practices because doing so can accurately determine
whether the particular prayer practice is permissible.67
Lund and Bormuth both involve prayer practices led directly by
commissioners at local board meetings that are open to the public, and both
practices invoke Christian sentiments throughout the history of their prayer
practice; however, only the Fourth Circuit, in Lund, held the practices
unconstitutional.68 The prayers given by Commissioners at the local town
meetings in Rowan County, North Carolina, explicitly stated that God was
the only way to eternal life and confessed for the sins of all in attendance
while dissidents were booed and jeered for failure to participate.69 While
one stray remark or exclusively Christian statement may not constitute a
violation, when taken in totality, the practice in Rowan County clearly
attempts to indoctrinate and allocate a burden to nonadherents.70 The Sixth
Circuit, in Bormuth, determined the practice of the County of Jackson Board
of Commissioners consistent with those upheld by the Supreme Court in
Marsh and Town of Greece.71 In Bormuth, the court found the prayer
statements reported in the district court record were made to solemnize the
meeting rather than indoctrinate attendees with a religion preferred by the
members of the board; the stray references to the Christian faith were not
enough to “despoil” the practice without evidence of indoctrination or
condemnation of nonadherents.72 When considered in totality, the courts
correctly determined the permissibility of the respective prayer practice

67. See Bormuth v. Cty. of Jackson, 870 F.3d 494, 539 (6th Cir. 2017) (en banc)
(Moore, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 274 (2002)) (noting
the Supreme Court has the use of a “divide and conquer” approach to analyzing
constitutional challenges of multi-faceted practices).
68. See Lund, 863 F.3d at 273 (indicating that after controversy grew, several
Commissioners announced they planned to continue giving the Christian prayers for the
benefit of the public).
69. See id. at 285 (quoting a prayer from August 2010: “God of healing mercies, we
come to you this day confessing that we are an imperfect people . . . . We acknowledge
that we’ve been given the pathway to peace, in the witness of Jesus Christ . . . . [But]
oftentimes we have failed to witness on Earth.”).
70. See Bormuth, 870 F.3d at 512-13 (explaining that one remark does not
necessarily despoil an entire prayer practice that would otherwise fall within the tradition
accepted by Marsh).
71. See id. at 498 (explaining the prayer practice implemented by the Jackson County
Board of Commissioners).
72. See Lund, 863 F.3d at 272 (emphasizing that the prayer practice crossed a line
by identifying government with Christianity and potentially conveying that other faiths
were unwelcome); see also Bormuth, 870 F.3d at 498 (stating that the prayer practice is
facially neutral and possessed no discriminatory intent).
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because the factual records warranted different outcomes.73
2. While the Intimate Setting of County Commissioner Meetings Included
Many Nonadherents, the Prayer Practices Are Not Impermissible Unless
Commissioners Attempt to Indoctrinate or Allocate Benefits or Burdens
Based on Attendees’ Participation.
Marsh and Town of Greece determined that legislative prayer in hearings
at state legislatures and local board meetings, like invocations before
Congressional hearings, fit within the well-accepted tradition recognized by
the Court.74 Petitioners in both Lund and Bormuth argue that the intimate
setting of the prayer practice is coercive because nonadherents feel
compelled to participate for fear of being ostracized.75 Prayer practices that
rise to the level of coercion are impermissible because the First Amendment
prohibits the government from coercing citizens to support or participate in
religious exercises against one’s own religious beliefs and devotions.76
Prayer practices at local board meetings are not automatically deemed
coercive as a result of a more intimate setting.77 However, analysis differs if
the elected officials direct the participation in the prayer practice because this
direction can be coercive, compelling many attendees to participate for fear
of heeding the burdens that result from opposing the directions of the
lawmakers before them.78
73. Compare Lund, 863 F.3d at 272 (ruling that the prayer practice made attempts to
proselytize and convert attendees), with Bormuth, 870 F.3d at 512-13 (holding that stray
remarks do not constitute an impermissible practice).
74. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 795 (1983) (upholding legislative prayer
in the Nebraska Legislature); see also Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811,
1815-816 (2014) (recognizing that no constitutional violation existed in the informal
prayer selecting method used by the town’s board).
75. Compare Lund, 863 F.3d at 288 (suggesting plaintiffs’ discomfort with the
prayer practice is not trivial), with Bormuth, 870 F.3d at 528 (holding that Bormuth’s
claim of coercion fails under either standard of coercion set forth in Town of Greece).
76. Compare Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 694 (2005) (finding that statues of
the Ten Commandments at the Texas State Capital did not violate the Establishment
Clause after determining that mere presence did not compel the petitioner to read or even
look at the statue; mere offense is not coercion), with Cty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492
U.S. 573, 628 (1989) (specifying that the Court has never relied on coercion alone as the
hallmark of Establishment Clause analysis).
77. See Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1818 (reversing the Court of Appeals and
holding the prayer practice at the local board meeting to be consistent with the tradition
and transgresses permitted by First Amendment).
78. See id. at 1825 (acknowledging that board members in Greece, New York,
participated in the prayers but never gestured for the citizens in attendance to solicit their
participation in the prayer practice).
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The commissioners in both Lund and Bormuth directed the prayer practice
by asking the attendees to stand and pray with them.79 Alone, the
Commissioners’ directions do not amount to coercion if attendees can
willingly opt out of participating in the prayer practice, and abstention does
not result in mistreatment of nonadherent attendees.80 Commissioners in
neither Lund nor Bormuth prohibited attendees from arriving at the meetings
late or merely sitting during the invocation, which allows nonadherents to
avoid the prayer practice completely or sit idly while it takes place.81 The
petitioner in Bormuth admitted to refusing to participate because the practice
was inconsistent with his Pagan beliefs.82 The mistreatment and disfavor
expressed to dissidents in Lund demonstrates the impermissibility of the
Rowan County Board of Commissioners’ prayer practice.83 The petitioner
in Bormuth failed to prove that the board treated dissidents in Jackson
County differently due to failure to partake in the prayer practice.84 It is
possible that Jackson County Commissioners’ personal disagreements with
petitioner Bormuth resulted from Bormuth’s disposition on other matters
throughout the course of the meetings rather than his distain toward the
opening invocations.85 The requests by commissioners to stand and pray in
both Lund and Bormuth do not trigger an impermissible coercion because
the attendees could opt out of the prayer practice; however, when
79. Compare Lund, 863 F.3d at 272 (conveying that all five members of the Board
of Commissioners rise and bow their heads just before the commissioner leading the
prayer asks all in attendance to join him in worship), with Bormuth, 870 F.3d at 498
(specifying that the Chairman of the Board typically asks his fellow Commissioners and
citizens in attendance to “rise and assume a reverent position.”).
80. See Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1825 (noting that direction to stand and pray
given by the guest minister was inclusive rather than coercive because ministers were
likely accustomed to directing their congregation in the same manner, so the court
continued the analysis to determine if evidence supported a finding of impermissible
indirect coercion, which it determined not to be present).
81. See Lund, 863 F.3d at 274 (suggesting these options seemed to only serve to
marginalize attendees who were uncomfortable with the observance of the prayer
practice at the board meeting).
82. See Bormuth, 870 F.3d at 516-17 (noting that petitioner Bormuth’s “quiet
acquiescence” should not interpreted as acceptance of the expressed ideas).
83. See Lund, 863 F.3d at 288 (identifying that others booed the only attendee who
openly objected to the prayer practice).
84. See Bormuth, 870 F.3d at 517-19 (indicating that petitioner Bormuth believed
that commissioners excluded him because of his Pagan beliefs but the court attributed no
weight to his allegations).
85. See id. at 517 (specifying that petitioner Bormuth’s vocal stance on controversial
topics such as abortion and his demeanor at the meetings likely attributed to the treatment
he encountered).
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commissioners burden nonadherents, such as booing nonparticipants, the
practice may become too coercive and consequently exceed the scope of
Marsh and Town of Greece.86
In addition to the setting, courts must consider the proximity of the prayer
to governmental action, such as voting on issues before the board, to
determine the potential for coercion for a particular prayer practice in its
setting.87 Petitioners in Lund and Bormuth advance a similar argument as
petitioners in Town of Greece by asserting that constituents in attendance
feel pressured to participate in the prayer practice to avoid negative
consequences from the lawmakers at their local county commissioners’
meetings.88 Attendees at local board meetings often petition for rights and
benefits, advocate for important community causes, and participate in
democracy.89 Participation or failure to participate during the recognition of
invocation should not affect how commissioners rule on the matters brought
before the board because the Establishment Clause prohibits such actions by
state agencies due to evidence of favor or disfavor of any religion.90
In Lund, the commissioners conducted business moments after the prayer;
the board members considered and subsequently approved or denied the
petitions put forth by the citizens in attendance.91 Alternatively, in Bormuth,
86. See Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1826 (2014) (stating
Commissioners and fellow citizens should not find a nonbeliever’s absence disrespectful
or noteworthy or a nonadherent’s acquiescence as an agreement with the expressed
notions).
87. Compare Lund, 863 F.3d at 288 (indicating that the commissioners considering
the attendee’s petitions moments after the invocation presents, at the very least, an
opportunity for abuse), with Bormuth, 870 F.3d at 516 (referencing that the plurality in
Town of Greece rejected Justice Kagan’s dissent describing the “chasm” between prayers
on given the legislative floor and prayers given at intimate town hall meetings (citing
Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1851-52 (Kagan, J., dissenting))).
88. See Bormuth, 870 F.3d at 516 (indicating that nothing in the record suggests that
the members of the board in Greece, New York gave preference to attendees that
participated or ruled on issues in a way that disadvantaged nonadherents to the prayer
practice).
89. See generally Lund, 863 F.3d at 287-88 (articulating that attendance at one’s
place of government and one’s place of worship are very different).
90. See id. at 287 (revealing that attendance at these local board meetings are not
always completely voluntary because the citizens in attendance are advancing programs
that they are passionate about or petitioning for changes that directly affect their
communities).
91. See id. at 288 (explaining that the board had many functions, including
adjudicatory power over zoning petitions, permit applications, and contract awards); see
also Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1829 (Alito, J. concurring) (pointing out that
legislative acts, rather than adjudicatory acts, proceeded the prayer practice in Greece,
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the neutral prayer practice permitted prayers followed by the Pledge of
Allegiance and then proceeded by legislative and adjudicatory business
matters.92 At first glance, the practices do not seem significantly dissimilar,
yet the court distinguished between proximity of prayers to legislative and
adjudicatory matters to illustrate citizen compulsion present at the start of
the meeting, when the invocation typically takes place.93
3. Prayer Practices That Attempt to Indoctrinate or Proselytize the
Public in Attendance, Rather Than to Solemnize the Meeting Before
Lawmakers Preside Over Important Matters, Fall Outside the Traditional
Scope of Prayer Practices.
Traditionally, the Court has held that legislative prayer, regardless of
setting, solemnizes and invokes heavenly guidance to set the mind in a frame
appropriate for making decisions.94 Prayers are given to exalt legislators
before conducting business, not to proselytize or indoctrinate the citizens in
attendance.95 Courts presume that a reasonable adult observer is well aware
of this tradition and understands its purpose to solemnize and to recognize
the importance of religion to the lives of many citizens in this nation.96
In Lund, the content of the prayer expanded beyond merely reminding
commissioners of a higher purpose; the language targeted members of the
New York).
92. See Bormuth, 870 F.3d at 498 (explaining that the prayer practice in Jackson
County, Michigan, rotated the opportunity for commissioners to pray in accordance to
the commissioner’s own conscience without review of another member or the board as a
whole).
93. See Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1829 (Alito, J., concurring) (declaring that
invocations do not take place before the second part of the meeting, the portion where
the board in Greece, New York conducted its adjudicatory duties).
94. See id. at 1816 (noting the town’s informal method for selecting local clergy to
give the invocation).
95. See id. at 1825 (indicating that the prayers in Greece, New York targeted only
the legislators). Compare Lund, 863 F.3d at 287 (stating that the record clearly depicts
that the commissioners sought audience involvement), with Bormuth, 870 F.3d at 512
(announcing that while the prayers varied in degree of religiosity, no evidence existed of
attempts to proselytize, threats of damnation to nonbelievers, or endeavors to convert).
96. See also Bormuth, 870 F.3d at 530-31 (relaying the Sixth Circuit Court’s view
that solicitation of adults to participate in the solemnization of meetings by standing
quietly is not inherently coercive). Compare Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1825
(assuming that adults firm in their own beliefs can tolerate a ceremonial prayer of a
different faith), with Doe. v. Indian River Sch. Dist., 653 F.3d 256, 275 (3rd Cir. 2011)
(ruling prayers at school board meeting impermissible and suggesting that there is a
greater possibility of coercion in schools because children are more susceptible to peer
pressure).
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audience.97 The content of the prayers in Lund urged those in attendance to
believe in God and embrace the religion of Christianity and preached
Christianity as the only way to deliverance.98 While the prayers in Bormuth
mentioned specifically Christian references by praying to Jesus and God
Almighty, the prayers made by the commissioners in the County of Jackson
fell within the “religious idiom accepted by our Founders” because they were
not given in effort to convert attendees but merely for the purpose of
solemnization.99
Furthermore, an examination of the pattern of prayer illustrates the
potential of prayer practices to cross from solemnization to
proselytization.100 While prayer practices may not preach conversion or
condemn other faiths, the content of legislative prayers is not required to be
nonsectarian.101 As indicated by Town of Greece, individual prayer givers
must be allowed to give prayers that align with their conscience.102 A
singular or even occasional sectarian prayer that references a god associated
with only one faith is not enough to conclude the prayer practice
unconstitutional.103 However, where there appears to be an improper prayer
practice, courts must examine the entire record.104
The Sixth Circuit, in Bormuth, conceded commissioners made exclusively
97. See Lund, 863 F.3d at 287 (noting that one commissioner asked attendees to join
him in prayers that asked the world to acknowledge and trust that God sent his son, Jesus
Christ, to “save us from our sins”).
98. See id. at 285 (specifying that one prayer asked God to enable the Commissioners
to spread God’s message).
99. See Bormuth, 870 F.3d at 512 (clarifying that reference to the Christian faith does
not make the prayer practice fall outside the purview of the Establishment Clause).
100. See Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1826-27 (implying that review of a particular
prayer practice is warranted if there is a substantial likelihood for coercion to determine
whether the prayer practice comports with the tradition of respectful and solemn prayer).
101. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 795 (1983) (indicating that it is not the
Court’s job to parse the content of a particular prayer unless the prayer opportunity has
been exploited to convert or disparage nonbelievers); see also Town of Greece, 134 S.
Ct. at 1814 (maintaining that Marsh was not upheld because of the use of general
terminology, but rather because the principles of disestablishment and religious freedom
can coexist in the context of legislative prayer).
102. See Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1822 (suggesting that requiring all prayers to
be nonsectarian would force courts to censor religious speech which is contrary to the
essence of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment).
103. See Bormuth, 870 F.3d at 512 (acknowledging that one remark pales in
comparison to the repetitive attempts to advance Christianity recognized by the Fourth
Circuit in Lund).
104. See Lund v. Rowan Cty., 863 F.3d 268, 283 (4th Cir. 2017) (explaining that the
record includes the content and transcripts of the invocations).
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Christian references but concluded that these references, such as invoking
the name of Jesus or the Holy Spirit, do not denigrate nonbelievers or preach
conversion.105 Conversely, the prayer practices analyzed by the Fourth
Circuit in Lund depict a pattern of attempts to convert nonbelievers and
demean minority religions by indicating that Christianity is supreme to all
other religions.106
4. The Identity of the Prayer Giver As a Legislator Is Not Per Se
Unconstitutional and Thus, Constitutional Challenges Require an
Individual Evaluation of the Prayer Practice in Question.
The Supreme Court has yet to address the notion that the identity of the
prayer giver is per se inconsistent with the Establishment Clause.107 The
plurality in Town of Greece cautioned that the analysis would be different if
the board members directed the public to participate in the opening
prayers.108 The identity of the prayer giver can play a significant role in
determining if coercion exists.109 There is a more significant threat of
coercion when the prayer giver requesting attendants’ participation are the
same individuals that will ultimately vote on the matter brought before the
board at the meeting.110 However, the identity of the prayer giver as a
105. See Bormuth, 870 F.3d at 512-13 (illustrating one prayer identified by the
petitioner that specifically spoke of blessing Christians that may be targets of
“extremists”).
106. See Lund, 863 F. 3d at 283-85 (quoting prayers that preach conversion of
nonadherents: “Father, I pray that all may be one as you, Father, are in Jesus, and He in
you. I pray that they may be one in you, that the world may believe that you sent Jesus
to save us from our sins. May we hunger and thirst for righteousness, be made perfect in
holiness, and be preserved, whole and entire, spirit, soul, and body, irreproachable at the
coming of our Lord Jesus Christ.”).
107. Compare Bormuth, 870 F.3d at 512 (determining that the identity of the prayer
giver should not determine the constitutionality of the practice because that analysis
deems permissible prayers unconstitutional solely based on the agent delivering the
prayer), with Lund, 863 F.3d at 281 (indicating that courts should consider the prayer
giver’s identity when evaluating the other elements of the practice).
108. See Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1826 (2014) (suggesting the
analysis only changes if the elected officials treated nonadherents differently for failure
to participate).
109. See Lund, 863 F.3d at 281 (suggesting that the court evaluated other elements
through the lens of the prayer giver’s identity because the prayer giver was an agent of
the state). But see Bormuth, 870 F.3d at 513 (implying that the religious references
reflected the individual Commissioners’ beliefs rather than the opinions of the Jackson
County Board).
110. See Lund, 863 F.3d at 319 (explaining the standard from Town of Greece that
state coercion may exist when the lawmaker directs the public to participate, singles out
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legislator has not been found per se unconstitutional; rather each prayer
practice requires individual evaluation.111 In its holding, the Fourth Circuit
in Lund notes that lawmaker-led prayer is not per se unconstitutional but
finds it difficult to discern if any constitutional limitations exist to legislative
prayer if the court permitted the practices of the Rowan County Board of
Commissioners to continue.112
Town of Greece suggests that the Court is more concerned with the effect
of the prayer practice creating instances of coercion, indoctrination, or
condemnation of nonadherents than the identity of the prayer giver.113
Consequently, Bormuth remains consistent with existing jurisprudence
because the Sixth Circuit held there was not enough evidence in the record
to support Mr. Bormuth’s claims that the County of Jackson Board of
Commissioners exceeded scope of traditionally accepted solemn prayer
practices.114
B. The Sixth Circuit Would Have Reached a Different Outcome If the
Court Considered Evidence that the Pro Se Petitioner, Bormuth, Failed to
Maintain in the District Court Record.
Upon appeal from the district court, Americans United for Separation of
Church and State (Americans United) filed an amicus brief to strengthen
appellant Bormuth’s position.115 Americans United, on behalf of Bormuth,
nonadherents, or indicates his decisions are influenced by participation or lack of
participation in the religious practice). Contra Bormuth, 870 F.3d at 508-09 (noting that
social pressures do not necessarily equate coercion because Justices Thomas and Scalia
hold the opinions that “coercion is limited to ‘coercive state establishments’ ‘by force of
law or threat of penalty’” (quoting Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct, at 1837 (Thomas, J.,
concurring in part and in judgment))).
111. See Lund, 863 F.3d at 280 (noting that legislator-led prayer has its limits just as
sectarian prayers do); see also Bormuth, 870 F.3d at 509 (denying petitioner Bormuth’s
contention that legislator-led prayer is per se unconstitutional).
112. See Lund, 863 F.3d at 290 (noting that the court’s holding is a limited ruling on
the specific prayer practices at the specific setting of the commissioner meetings).
113. See generally Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1826 (suggesting that while not
present in this case, if circumstances arise alleging that legislative prayer demeans
nonadherents or imposes a religious dogma, claims arising out of those circumstances
may succeed).
114. See Bormuth, 870 F.3d at 498 (holding that the legislator-led prayer was
consistent with the Constitution).
115. AU Files Brief in Michigan Legislative Prayer Case, CHURCH & STATE MAG.
(May 2017), https://au.org/church-state/may-2017-church-state/people-events/au-filesbrief-in-michigan-legislative-prayer-case (informing that Americans United,
accompanied by the American Civil Liberties Union, filed a brief opposing the County
of Jackson prayer practice because commissioners led exclusively Christian prayers and
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attempted to illustrate the constitutional violations produced by the prayer
practice by supplementing evidence presented by petitioner Bormuth.116
Judges in the Sixth Circuit decided sua sponte to hear the case en banc
after a panel of Sixth Circuit Judges ruled the County of Jackson prayer
practice to be a violation of the Establishment Clause while considering the
additional evidence.117 The Sixth Circuit sitting en banc declined to hear
certain facts considered in the earlier panel because the district court
previously denied appellant Bormuth’s motion to supplement the record.118
The court did not consider the evidence offered on appeal due to a procedural
restriction prohibiting the introduction of new evidence on appeal even when
the evidence offered by the appellant presented a genuine issue of material
fact.119 The additional evidence included statements made by commissioners
criticizing Bormuth for questioning the constitutionality of the prayer
practice, letters from commissioners denying Bormuth positions on two
committees as a result of his opposition, and videos demonstrating the
commissioners only gave invocations before meetings open to the public.120
However, had the additional evidence been evaluated, the Sixth Circuit
sitting en banc likely would have found that a constitutional violation existed
because the additional facts showed that commissioners excluded nonChristian prayer givers from controlling the content of the invocation and
disparaged dissenters of the prayer practice, including Bormuth).
116. See generally Brief for Americans United for the Separation of Church and State
as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Bormuth v. Cty. of Jackson, 870 F.3d 494 (6th
Cir. 2017) (No. 15-1869) (explaining that the prayer practice violated the Constitution
because it impermissibly advances Christianity and coerces religious participation).
117. See generally Bormuth v. Cty. of Jackson, 849 F.3d 266, 273-76 (6th Cir. 2017),
aff’d en banc, 870 F.3d 494 (6th Cir. 2017) (determining that the district court abused its
discretion by granting a motion to quash and denying a motion to supplement the record,
but holding the errors to be harmless because the record before the district court
supported Bormuth’s motion for summary judgment as a matter of law).
118. See Bormuth v. Cty. of Jackson, 870 F.3d 494, 499-500 (6th Cir. 2017) (en banc)
(identifying two discovery items that included statements made by Commissioners after
petitioner Bormuth filed the lawsuit and publicly available videos of the Board of
Commissioner meetings found on the internet).
119. See id. (quoting Chicago Title Insurance Company v. Magnuson and restating
that the court will not hear factual recitation that differs from the recitation at the district
court when hearing an appeal of a district court’s decision); see also id. (citing an en banc
ruling in E.E.O.C v. Ford Motor Company and describing the burden on the opposing
party under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c)).
120. See id. at 500-01 (emphasizing that Bormuth did not offer any specific video
evidence at the district court level); see also Bormuth, 849 F.3d at 271-73 (explaining
the evidentiary disputes between the parties that also included Bormuth’s efforts to take
depositions).
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insulted Bormuth for his abstention and disparagement of the prayer
practice.121
In an effort to salvage evidence that pro se litigant Bormuth failed to
maintain on the district court record, Bormuth and amicus curiae claimed the
video recordings of the Board’s meetings were mentioned within petitioner’s
briefs and the videos remained on the Board’s website for the public to
view.122 Alternatively, if the court did not accept the videos as part of the
record, Bormuth and amicus curiae requested that the court at least take
judicial notice of the content of the videos for appeal under Federal Rule of
Evidence 201.123 Judicial notice of the videos may have been warranted
because the Board in County of Jackson admitted to the accuracy of the
videos on their website as live recordings of the monthly board of
commissioner meetings.124 Ultimately, the Sixth Circuit sitting en banc
denied the request because taking judicial notice of evidence never
introduced during the fact-finding process might create an evidentiary
loophole.125 On appeal, Bormuth also questioned the district court’s ruling
that prevented him from supplementing the record in regards to the Board’s
decision to deny him appointment to a position on the Board of Public Works
or the Solid Waste Planning Committee because Bormuth was the most
qualified person for the position and claimed to be denied as a result of his
objection to the prayer practice at the monthly meetings.126
The additional evidence demonstrates that the Board of Commissioners in

121. See generally Bormuth, 870 F.3d 494 at 543-44 (Moore, J., dissenting)
(underscoring the details of the prayer practice that led to the conclusion that upholding
the prayer practice rests in opposition to Justice Alito’s concurrence in Town of Greece
that identifies a difference between a chaplain and a government official requesting
citizens to rise and participate in a religious prayer).
122. See id. at 499-500 (emphasizing that one need not look past the opinion of the
magistrate judge or district judge to know that Bormuth failed to provide any video
evidence to the district court).
123. See id. at 501 (specifying that Jackson County concedes the accuracy of the
videos posted on the website and noting that the court has the necessary information
needed to take notice).
124. See Fed. R. Evid. 201 (indicating that a court may take judicial notice at any
stage of a proceeding on its own or if presented with the necessary information after one
party makes a request).
125. See Bormuth, 870 F.3d at 501 (suggesting that accepting evidence on appeal in
order to reverse a decision made by a district court would subvert the relationship held
between district and appellate courts).
126. See id. at 518-19 (indicating that the court knew more about the application to
the Board of Public Works but suggesting the record fails to demonstrate the denial of
the position stemmed from Bormuth’s failure to participate in the prayer practice).
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Jackson County, Michigan, gave invocations for purposes other than
solemnizing the meeting for the benefit of the lawmakers and that
commissioners allocated burdens based on participation in the prayer
practice.127 These additional facts require a different holding than that
reached by the Sixth Circuit sitting en banc.128 The first step in analyzing
whether the prayer practice is permissible requires a court to determine
whether the prayer practice falls within the traditional scope of legislative
prayer.129 Traditional legislative prayer permitted governmental bodies to
solemnize the governmental proceedings to elevate the minds the lawmakers,
not to promote religion to the public.130 Americans United introduced
evidence illustrating that the County of Jackson prayer practice did not
function as a means of solemnizing the Board by offering a video depicting
that the only meeting during a two year period conducted without an offer of
invocation occurred on November 6, 2014, when no citizens were in
attendance.131 These videos demonstrate that the prayer practice falls outside
the scope of traditional purpose because the County Commissioners did not
give the invocation to exalt the lawmakers but rather for the “benefit” of the
public in attendance.132
The Sixth Circuit sitting en banc upheld the prayer practice, stating that
the record showed no evidence that the commissioners allocated benefits or
burdens due to their participation in the prayer practices.133 However, the
127. Contra id. at 501 (stating in footnote two of the opinion that the disposition of
the court would not change if the court considered the videos of the recorded Board of
Commissioner meetings that Bormuth proffered).
128. See supra Part II.A (describing the importance of a fact-sensitive analysis in
Establishment Clause inquiries).
129. See supra Part II.A.1 (explaining that court must first evaluate the prayer practice
against the backdrop of the historical practice); see also Town of Greece v. Galloway,
134 S. Ct. 1811, 1817 (2014) (indicating that the district court began its analysis by
reviewing Marsh v. Chambers, which permitted prayer practice so long as the practice
did not advance or disparage any one religion).
130. See Lund v. Rowan Cty., 863 F.3d 268, 272 (4th Cir. 2017) (en banc)
(emphasizing that legislative prayer can further both religious exercise and religious
tolerance).
131. See Bormuth v. Cty. of Jackson, 849 F.3d 266, 284-85 (6th Cir. 2017), aff’d en
banc, 870 F.3d 494 (6th Cir. 2017) (noting that pro se petitioner, Bormuth, waived the
argument presented by Amicus Americans United that the Board’s choice to only
conduct prayers in the presence of the public supported the assertion that the
commissioners offered prayers to promote religion rather than to solemnize the meeting).
132. See id. (extrapolating that the Board uses the prayer practice for the purposes of
proselytizing members of the community in attendance at these meetings).
133. See Bormuth v. Cty. of Jackson, 870 F.3d 494, 512 (6th Cir. 2017) (en banc)
(maintaining that the prayers fall within the restraints required by Town of Greece).
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additional evidence proffered by Bormuth and Americans United
demonstrates that the Board treated petitioner Bormuth differently after he
voiced his disagreements with the prayer practice.134 After litigation
commenced, local newspapers released statements made by two
commissioners indicating that the two commissioners perceived Bormuth’s
abstention as a personal attack on their rights to conduct a prayer before the
meetings.135 Other Commissioners reportedly turned their backs as Bormuth
spoke during the public comments portion of the Board’s meeting.136 These
additional facts trigger the warning put forth in Town of Greece that prayer
practices must not disparage dissidents or benefit adherents.137
Bormuth asserted additional instances of the Board of Commissioners
demonstrating disfavor of his resistance to participate in the prayer practice;
he claimed that the Board denied appointing him to the Solid Waste Planning
Committee or the Board of Public Works despite his qualifications for the
positions.138 Bormuth asserted that he was the most qualified applicant for
the vacancy on the Board of Public Works and believed the Board of
Commissioners denied his appointment because of his Pagan religious
beliefs, his objection to the Christian prayer practice, and his pursuit of the
lawsuit.139
Giving weight to these additional facts and taking judicial notice of the
videos of the County of Jackson monthly meetings demonstrates that the
prayer practice in place in the County of Jackson, Michigan, is impermissible
when viewed under the totality of the circumstances.140 The practice falls
134. See id. at 527 (Moore, J., dissenting) (emphasizing that a newspaper article
released shortly after petitioner Bormuth filed the suit revealed the Commissioner’s
disapproval).
135. See id. at 517-18 (quoting Commissioner Rice: “Our civil liberties should not be
taken away from us, as commissioner,” and Commissioner Duckham: “What about my
right?”).
136. See id. (indicating that the Sixth Circuit sitting en banc concedes the
Commissioners reacted poorly but gave no constitutional weight to the actions of the
Commissioners).
137. See generally Town of Greece v. Galloway 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1826 (2014)
(distinguishing that petitioners provided no evidence that lawmakers in Greece treated
citizens differently whether they participate or choose to abstain).
138. See Bormuth, 870 F.3d at 519 (stressing that Bormuth introduced the rejection
letter regarding the Solid Waste Committee).
139. See id. (requiring Bormuth to go “beyond the pleadings” to defeat County of
Jackson’s motion for summary judgment by providing more evidence than the
correlation between his objections and the Board’s denial of appointments).
140. See id. at 544 (Moore, J., dissenting) (concluding that Commissioners’ attempt
to silence Bormuth and their treatment illustrate how Jackson County’s prayer practice
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outside the traditional scope of legislative prayer by directing prayers at
citizens in the audience and attempting to promote Christian prayer and by
the Commissioners’ mistreatment of nonadherents.
III. POLICY RECOMMENDATION
A. The Supreme Court Should Take Up the Issue to Answer Looming
Questions Regarding the Constitutionality of Legislator-Led Prayer and
Establish an Analytical Framework to Be Followed By Lower Courts.
Currently, a rigid circuit split exists among the Fourth Circuit and Sixth
Circuit regarding legislator-led prayer.141 Other courts, such as district
courts, have also issued conflicting rulings due to the Court’s failure to
provide guidance and answer questions that grew from Town of Greece’s
conclusion that the analysis would be different if the lawmakers directed the
audience to participate in the prayer practice.142 The Court has yet to address
the issue of lawmaker-led prayer, despite petitions of certiorari filed by the
parties in Lund and Bormuth.143 The Court should take up the issue to
properly clarify the role of tradition in legislative prayer cases and determine
whether prayers led exclusively by lawmakers are consistent with the
disestablishment principles of the First Amendment.144
The Supreme Court should not issue a sweeping declaration that
lawmaker-led prayer is permissible. While legislative prayer, including
strays from the traditionally tolerated legislative prayer).
141. See Gregory, supra note 7 (noting that this case marks the third time the Court
has taken a case regarding legislative prayer).
142. See Williamson v. Brevard Cty., No. 6:15-cv-1098-Orl-28DCI, 2017 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 163707, at *93-94 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 30, 2017) (holding the Brevard County prayer
practice to be a violation of the First Amendment because the practice controls citizens’
opportunity to participate in the prayer practice based on his religious beliefs); Doe v.
Pittsylvania Cty., 842 F.Supp.2d 906, 927 (W.D. Va. 2012) (denying the Board’s motion
to dismiss and stating that the practice of opening meetings with Christian prayers runs
afoul the First Amendment); see also Hinrichs v. Bosma, 400 F.Supp.2d 1103, 1104
(S.D. Ind. 2005) (granting declaratory and injunctive relief to petitioners challenging the
prayer practice of the Indiana General Assembly but maintaining that relief did not
prevent opening House sessions with prayers so long as all official prayers remain
inclusive and nonsectarian).
143. See Lund v. Rowan Cty., 138 S. Ct. 2564, 2564 (2018) (noting Justice Thomas’s
and Justice Gorsuch’s dissent from the denial of certiorari); see also Bormuth v. Jackson
Cty., 138 S. Ct. 2708, 2708 (2018) (indicating the Court denied the petition for writ of
certiorari).
144. See Gregory, supra note 7 (quoting Professor Frank S. Ravitch, from Michigan
State University, when stating that the Court may wait to take the case after watching
what other circuits do in this area).
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prayers led directly by lawmakers, is consistent with the tradition of this
nation, allowing prayer practices that intentionally exclude minority
religions or align governmental entities with any one religion defies the
principles of the First Amendment by promoting one religion and
condemning others.145 If the Supreme Court upholds lawmaker-led prayer,
the Court should provide guidance that the prayer practice must not promote
one religion by proselytizing or allocating burdens and benefits to citizens
by virtue of one’s religious affiliation.
IV. CONCLUSION
Although conflicting rulings by circuit courts during the same year on such
parallel topics may indicate that one circuit got it wrong while the other
circuit got it right, the fact-specific inquiry required in Establishment Clause
cases proves that both the Fourth Circuit and the Sixth Circuit ruled correctly
on the matter of legislator-led prayer.146 The prayer practice in Lund
exemplified a pattern of proselytizing and preaching conversion whereas the
petitioner in Bormuth failed to prove that the prayer practices of the County
of Jackson Board of Commissioners were inconsistent with traditionally
accepted practices.147 However, if the Sixth Circuit considered information
that the pro se petitioner failed to properly place on the district court record,
the court would have held the prayer practice of the County of Jackson Board
of Commissioners unconstitutional due to the additional facts revealed to the
court.148

145. See generally Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971) (explaining that the
language of the Establishment Clause prevents more than the establishment of a formal
state religion but also prohibits government action respecting the establishment of
religion, such as the promotion of one religion over any others).
146. See generally Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1814 (2014)
(establishing that challenges to legislative prayer requires a fact-sensitive inquiry to show
the town leaders are not coercing the members of the public to engage in religious
activities contrary to his own beliefs).
147. Compare Lund v. Rowan Cty., 863 F.3d 268, 287 (4th Cir. 2017) (en banc)
(noting that the record clearly depicts that the content of the prayers suggested that
Christianity was the one true faith), with Bormuth v. Cty. of Jackson, 870 F.3d 494, 51213 (6th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (explaining that while the prayers had a Christian tone, no
evidence of attempts to proselytize or convert nonbelievers existed).
148. See Bormuth, 870 F.3d at 499-500 (noting the rule that state appellate courts do
not have to accept facts even if the proffered evidence might show an outcome
determinative issue of material fact).
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